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Campaign finance laws that make small donations public may
lead to fewer people contributing and to smaller donations.
In the American states, campaign finance laws require disclosure of private information for
contributors at relatively low thresholds ranging from $1 to $300. The Internet has made it
relatively easy to publicize such information in a way that changes the social context for political
participation. Ray La Raja looks at how public disclosure of campaign contributions affects
citizens’ willingness to give money to candidates. Drawing on social influence theory, his analysis
suggests that citizens are sensitive to divulging private information, especially those who are
surrounded by people with different political views. He shows that individuals refrain from making
small campaign contributions or reduce their donations to avoid disclosing their identities.  
Citizens strongly favor disclosing the source of political contributions to parties and candidates.  Aside from
serving as deterrent to corruption, making donations transparent provides information to voters to hold politicians
accountable.  For decades many American states have required donors to disclose information about themselves
—names, addresses, and even occupations.  Today, this information is accessible via the Internet for all to see. 
 In recent research, I explore the potential negative consequences of disclosure based on theories of social
influence, which suggest that revealing political references imposes real costs on some people.
The salience of these costs was made apparent to me when I read about what happened to petition signers and
donors in a controversial California ballot measure against same-sex marriage. The ballot measure won, and
opponents used a mash-up of donor lists and Google maps to pinpoint the homes and businesses of supporters. 
In the aftermath of the election, the news media reported acts of intimidation, vandalism, boycotts and even death
threats toward citizens who apparently supported the ballot measure.
Perhaps this was an unusual case but it raises important issues about the role of transparency in civic life.  
Notable figures in the US, such as Justice Antonin Scalia, favor a lot of transparency, arguing that citizens should
be responsible for what they say or do.  In his words, “running a democracy takes a certain about of civic
courage”.  Others claim this position is too heroic for ordinary citizens and will surely discourage political
participation.  My goal was to test empirically whether citizens participate less when they realize that private
information will be divulged to the public.  I looked specifically at how such laws affect small donors.
Using experimental survey data I looked at how potential donors behave when they realize their names might be
made public.   Half the respondents were asked “how much, if anything, would you consider donating to a
candidate who reflects your views:  The amounts offered were between 0-$2500 and most respondents (who
chose to donate anything) gave amounts less than $50.  In the treatment group respondents had the same
question but with a the additional statement: “please note: names of donors are made public on the Internet.”  I
also varied this last statement to adjust the amounts at which donations would be made public (e.g., “over $50” or
“over $100”) to see if people changed the amounts they gave based on these thresholds.
The findings demonstrate that transparency does, in fact, have a chilling effect on participation.  And the impact is
especially salient for citizens who are cross-pressured.  The far right box below shows respondents with ‘‘very
different’’ views from those around them (who would be able to know of their donation). The horizontal line across
the graphs signifies a baseline of zero for the control condition (no disclosure statement), and the point estimates
reflect deviations from this baseline. Those who face disclosure starting at $1 experience a 51 percent decline in
the proportion donating compared to the control; at $50 disclosure the decline is 46 percent; and at $100 the
decline is 38 percent.
Figure 1 – Social Context and the Effect of Publicity on Proportion Contributing
The findings also show that citizens are more likely to give contributions below the threshold when they learn the
donation will be revealed.  The bar chart below illustrates the contributions from respondents in the disclosure
group (blue) and non-disclosed group (red).  Donors typically give sums in round amounts like $25, $50, and
$100. However, donors faced with a $50 disclosure threshold are less likely to make a $100 donation compared to
thecontrol group with no disclosure threshold.  Many choose instead to bunch theircontributions at $50 or $25 to
avoid disclosure.  The graph does not show this but the $50 threshold causes donors to cut back on contributions
from an average size of $80 to just $32, which reflects a 60 percent decrease. 
Figure 2 – Distribution of Small Contributions When Disclosure Threshold at $50
Finally, I look more closely at the cross-pressured citizens. Their giving declines even more steeply than other
citizens.  The figure below shows that citizens react negatively but those surrounded by people with ‘different
views’ change their behavior the most when facing disclosure at $50 threshold.  The average contribution
plummets by $142 (from a baseline of $175) among respondents facing strong interpersonal cross pressures.
This brings the average contribution to just $33, which is a decline of 81 percent.
Figure 3 – Social Context and Effect of Publicity on Amount Contributed
In sum, it appears that citizens do not necessarily like to reveal preferences, particularly those who experience
interpersonal cross-pressures.   The analysis adds to our understanding about how secrecy or its absence affects
citizens’ willingness to engage in politics.  Importantly, this study suggests that the Internet may change the social
context for some forms of political engagement in potentially negative ways, even as it enables some citizens to
engage more robustly (very likely those with strong political views who surround themselves with like-minded
partisans).
Overall, the findings indicate that transparency is not costless.  Policymakers should think about trade-offs and
where transparency is most usefully applied.  With respect to political contributions it might make sense to focus
on big donors and devise ways to provide partial but meaningful disclosure to voters without divulging individual
private information.
This article is based on the paper ‘Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative Effect of Transparency
on Making Small Campaign Contributions’ in Political Behavior. 
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